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Abstract
In response to Hytten’s provocative opening of a conversation about an ethics for activist teaching, in
this essay I address three interesting contributions that Hytten made. First, I explore the significance
of the imagined ethical subject in Hytten’s example and in many prior authors’ work on ethics in social
justice teaching. Expanding the imagined ethical subject (beyond the resistant student with limited
experience of difference), which Hytten began to do, is fruitful for additional contexts. Second, I
attend to the philosophical basis upon which Hytten rested her ethical theory and suggest some ways
that philosophers might follow her critical and pragmatist sensibilities and avoid the meta-ethical
limitations of more traditional ethical theory. Third, the essay ends with considerations of potentially
a more social ethics, and toward that end, I propose two communal habits implied in Hytten’s work—
cultivating solidarity and comfort with discomfort—that might complement the four habits Hytten
named in her ethics.
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I

n her essay, Hytten (2015) invites a conversation about
ethics in social justice teaching practices. Hytten names
several problems with social justice teaching practice and is
especially concerned with the ways social justice teaching may
contradict its purported aims to promote pluralistic engagement
and deep democracy. When educators describe ethical justifications for their teaching practice, they may conflate ethics and moral
commitments with social justice work. This is an important
philosophical distinction, and while we need not separate them
entirely (as Campbell [2008, 2013] has suggested), we need to
articulate a relation between them. As Hytten argues, conflating
ethics and social justice commitments can lead to self-righteous
justification for nonreflective teaching practices and unwarranted
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violence against the very students social justice educators wish to
prepare to be social justice advocates.
Absent from much of the discourse on social justice pedagogy
is engagement with the discourse on the ethics of teaching, and
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only on rare occasions has the discourse on teaching ethics
addressed social justice teaching. In some cases, Hytten (2015)
finds rather strong arguments against the possibility of reconciliation. Hytten is undaunted by these challenges. After synthesizing
these discourses, she names an ethical vision for social justice
teaching. She then names virtues and habits that may help establish
an engaged ethics for activist teaching. Drawing from critical and
pragmatist sensibilities, Hytten argues for three habits: reflective
humility, intellectual open-mindedness, and sympathetic attentiveness. She provocatively begins what should be a vital conversation, especially in schools of education but also throughout the
education sector.
In this essay response, I take up the provocative invitation
and focus on schools of education as specific sites for social justice
teaching. I highlight some explicit and implicit philosophical
moves in Hytten’s (2015) essay, and I consider the implications of
the vision and advocacy role that she proposes for social justice
teaching and how it relates to educational goals. While acknowledging some constraints related to the critical and pragmatist
approaches Hytten takes, I offer additional communal habits—
namely cultivating classrooms of solidarity and a comfort with
discomfort—that are embedded in her analysis and may complement the habits she has already proposed. I propose these habits to
further enact the communal goals of social justice teaching.

When It Comes to the Ethics
of Teaching, Context Matters
In education discourse, we are apparently especially concerned
with preservice public school teachers, because much of the
discourse about social justice pedagogy focuses on this population
of students, who might then adopt or adapt social justice pedagogy
for their own classrooms. While Hytten (2015) does not explicitly
contain her discussion to teacher educators, she seems most
interested in teachers of students in teacher preparation and other
early professional programs. The student implied by much of her
discussion is the one with limited experience and without much
exposure to difference. Much attention is paid to the student who
resists participation or who derides social justice pedagogy as
biased and ideological. Considering the demographic situation in
the United States of a largely White and middle-class corps of
teacher education candidates, coupled with an increasingly diverse
public school population and widespread poverty, the emphasis is
understandable. Resistance to a pedagogical form is certainly a
problem, and when resistance amounts to refusal to engage with
difference, there are legitimate, considerable concerns for the
professional preparedness of the student.
From at least two standpoints, however, an emphasis on
students who are resistant to engaging with different perspectives
may be problematic for an ethics for social justice teaching, and
Hytten (2015) hints at these difficulties. From a pedagogical
standpoint, if the modal student is one resistant to engaging in a
pluralistic setting, students with broader experiences may not have
their own learning needs met. From an ethical standpoint, this
becomes a concern for equitable treatment—if the primary ethical
concern is pushing resistant students too hard, the moral concern
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presupposes a particular kind of ethical self: one who must be
convinced to act beyond one’s own self interest in order to be
ethical. A closer look suggests that Hytten is moving away from
these problematic limitations of teaching ethics. Much of what she
is talking about is geared toward helping the previously nonreflective to become more reflective. At the same time, she is also
concerned about students who enact violence in the classroom and
who attempt to maintain subjugation of others through microaggressions. She briefly addresses the experiences of marginalized
populations of students, and in her other work, there is broader
focus to draw from.
As philosophers, we might explore in more depth the
imagined students who participate in our classrooms. We might
also explore our students’ habits of mind and the funds of knowledge that students with varied backgrounds might bring to the
classroom. An important philosophical question is this: What kind
of learning context do we assume? Do we imagine that our
classrooms are primarily places where nonreflective students
practice being more reflective so that they may become more
effective educators in a pluralistic society? Or do we imagine our
classrooms as spaces where engagement between and among
pluralistic discourses is enacted? I suspect that from her perspective, Hytten (2015) would argue that both of these imagined
learning contexts are enacted at various times and are impossible
to disentangle.
While the preparation of teachers and other early professionals
is an important aspect of schools of education, reducing every
philosophical discussion to that specific context runs the risk of
drawing us away from the specific contexts of our own classrooms,
including classrooms of midcareer professionals seeking higher
levels of certification or engaging in scholarly pursuits. The contexts
of these graduate-level classrooms bring their own unique challenges. While professional practice often makes these educators
more reflective than their more novice counterparts, their experiences and their reflections are quite varied. Often, particular
experiences have led them to problematic conclusions about the
populations with whom they have worked. A particular ethical
challenge in these circumstances is how to challenge their taken-
for-granted assumptions while respecting them as professionals—
avoiding infantilizing them or ignoring their ethical positioning, for
instance (Nash, 2002). As these seasoned professionals come into
positions of increasing responsibility, the opportunities for them to
enact social justice change can be quite profound. While much has
been written about the moral agency of teachers over the years,
much less attention has focused on the moral agency of school
leaders. These leaders are in a position to create conditions in
schools where teachers’ moral agency may flourish. In these
contexts, we may find educators who have given up on innovative
practice in favor of what they term to be realistic responses to the
conditions under which they operate. Or we may encounter
powerful professionals at midcareer who are overconfident in their
abilities to engage in equity and social justice work. They may know
well how to avoid controversy rather than how to engage it. Future
scholars sometimes consider social justice a topic that holds no
interest for them or that gets in the way of their pursuit of academic
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careers. An ethics for social justice teaching might look different,
then, in these different contexts. The social justice educator might
not be focused so much on students with limited experiences with
differences but instead be challenged to provide opportunities for
students on opposite sides of life experiences to think differently
about themselves in relation to each other (especially when the
students in the class come from diverse ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic backgrounds). A classroom of veteran educators, for
instance, may be especially fruitful as a site of enacting deep
democracy, if an ethics of mutual and professional respect is
cultivated. A common ethical challenge at this level is taking
students past polite conversation to a space characterized by
deliberation (Piantanida & Garman, 2009), wherein students may
productively challenge each other. An ethics for social justice
pedagogy in this situation would ground the purposes for establishing conditions of mutual respect. For instance, the instructor may
cultivate mutual respect among students by modeling respectful
responses to differences of opinion. An ethics might inform an
instructor’s intervention in a moment of contentious misunderstanding between two students or it may inform an instructor’s
decision to acknowledge a microaggression. Hytten’s (2015) ethics
addresses many of the same issues, but in different contexts, one
aspect of the ethics may need more emphasis than others. Also,
educational goals may be different. Flexible and adaptable ethics for
the broad array of students we teach in schools of education would
help us clarify our various educational goals in relation to social
justice pedagogy and enact those goals with students at various
places in their educational journeys.

Social Justice Teaching as Ethically Problematic
Much of the social justice literature that addresses ethics does so to
justify, defend, or establish the value of social justice teaching.
Hytten (2015) retraces the major arguments and at one point argues
the necessity of a social justice position; her main reasons are the
pervasiveness of injustice and how important education is in
developing a more socially just society. She acknowledges that
social justice pedagogy may carry a political bias and counters that
such a critique assumes there is a neutral position from which
teachers may work. She offers that a neutral position is implausible,
and considering the evident social injustices in schools and society,
a neutral position is a position that may unintentionally perpetuate
injustice. Any pedagogy has political implications, and the
challenge is to understand the politics with appropriate sophistication, and philosophical work can deepen our understanding of how
politics and ethics interact.
Commentators on the subject have a hard time distinguishing
political and ethical components of social justice pedagogy.
Operating in this space, Hytten (2015) reframes the debate and
makes the philosophical problems more precise. For Hytten, a social
justice position by itself does not ethically justify any particular
teaching practice enacted by a social justice educator. Hytten is
convinced that bias is something that does indeed need to be
critiqued, but unlike commentators such as Campbell, the bias she is
referring to is not the position itself but the tendency to exercise an
impositional stance. For Hytten, bias needs to be critiqued when it
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does harm to others and, she implies, if it is counterproductive to the
struggle for social justice. Reading across Hytten’s article, I name
several of her concerns and expand upon them.
First is the chief danger: conflating the moral justification of
contending with issues of social justice and the ethics of teaching
about it. In the extreme is the danger of grounding one’s practice in
self-righteous indignation. Philosophically, this could take the
form of a justification wherein the end justifies the means. An actor
could use the principle of utility (or another consequentialist
ethics) to argue that actions are justified if the consequences of the
actions serve the greater good (Frankena, 1973). Besides the
Kantian objection, wherein individuals are never to be treated as
means to an end (e.g., Campbell, 2008, 2013), two additional
critiques can be launched against this perspective.
A consequentialist perspective, requiring consideration of
supposed ends for the choice of the most morally defensible action,
is dependent upon the moral actor to imagine possible outcomes
and to predict their likelihood. Following a teleological frame, an
advocate for social justice would be expected to have a telos in
mind that would ground pedagogical interactions. A Hegelian or
Marxian teleology could certainly be imagined to ground
pedagogy.
A second kind of critique can be imagined, one based in
something like the concept of positionality. We should expect the
consequences that one imagines for one’s pedagogy to be influenced by positionality, one’s social and historical locations (Alcoff,
1988; Milner, 2010). In practice, consequentialist ethics generally
suffer from this serious limitation. One’s capacity to imagine the
responses of others, particularly others with distinctly different
positionalities than one’s own, is necessarily limited. In resolving an
ethical dilemma, it is morally problematic to select the most
morally defensible consequences from among the immediately
imaginable ones. Consequentialist theory, most compelling when
employed retrospectively, is not morally forgiving of the well-
intended actor whose actions lead to unpleasant consequences. As
such, it is also not terribly helpful to the practicing teacher, who is
not likely to embrace the process of continually weighing possible
consequences of his or her actions to make ethical decisions to
inform teaching practice.
While, as I explain below, Hytten (2015) incorporates what she
calls a utopian vision, she is not making a consequentialist argument. Her intended ends draw from a pragmatist moral sensibility
that embraces neither Kantian nor consequentialist ethical frames.
Since we can expect a pragmatist ethicist to place outcomes under
careful scrutiny, it is not surprising that Hytten embraces deep
democracy, suggestive of a critical process of moral engagement.
Reading Campbell and Hytten in tandem makes it appear that the
two authors are writing in different philosophical languages (Nash,
2002). For her part, Campbell was concerned when social justice
pedagogy becomes ideological, when teacher educators impose
political views upon their students, and when in-service teachers
are supposed to adopt and enact the politically partisan views of
their instructors when they teach. Campbell saw social justice as at
best a distraction to the cultivation of professional teachers. For
her, teacher professionalism is itself grounded in the moral
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responsibilities of the teacher, and teaching for social justice
distracts from what she saw as the more defensible project of
cultivating ethical teachers. Campbell can be read as establishing
Kantian standards through which the problematics of social justice
teaching (as ideally presented, in extreme, or in actual practice—
it seems that Campbell has concerns about all three) make it
impossible to resolve with a teaching ethics.
While Hytten (2015) is concerned with the project of ethical
justification of social justice pedagogy, her substantive contribution moves beyond mere justification to seek an ethics of practice.
Following Sockett (2009), she turns to virtues and cultivating
habits. Following Valenzuela, she turns to an ethics of caring
couched within a culturally responsive sensibility, wherein a
educator’s intentions toward caring are placed within an interactive, inquiry-oriented engagement with students’ needs and
interests in caring. Taking these pragmatist and critical influences
together, Hytten wants social justice educators to cultivate the
habits of reflective humility, open-mindedness, and sympathetic
attentiveness.
A remaining question is the philosophical place of her
discussion of utopia. Throughout, Hytten (2015) names various
value positions for social justice advocates. She argues for the value
of pluralism and advocates transparency of values. She advocates
for a vision of the world: “Diversity is prized, every student is
valued, information is critiqued, and resources are distributed
fairly” (p. 3). While the values are agreeable, it is important to note
that not everyone will understand what it means to value them,
and as with any list of values, it is vital for dialogue among members of a community to determine what happens when various
values come into conflict with each other. That is precisely the
point for Hytten. Her vision for social justice is largely a living,
practicing ethics—grounded in mutual respect and mutual
engagement.
It makes sense that a philosophical argument grounded in
pragmatist ethics would call upon a broad vision of advocacy.
Valuing pluralism, for instance, could imply valuing varied visions
and utopian ideals. For instance, any institution with multiple
people committed to social justice will find their visions can come
into ready conflict. Social justice visions need not only be
expressed and enacted but also be made objects of inquiry. Within
a pragmatist frame, creating the pedagogy enacts competing values
in a social world through arrangements that embrace difference.
To go along with the pragmatist meta-ethics, in a particular
institutional context, it would make sense for the vision of advocacy to have an end-in-view. If the educational goal of social justice
pedagogy is the creation of a more socially just world, fairly serious
work needs to be done to figure out educational goals that are
reasonable to accomplish within the confines of a higher education
classroom. An institution might have a vision for social justice
pedagogy that takes on an urban focus, for instance, mobilizing
inquiry, pedagogy, and services that take the geographic context of
urbanity seriously and centrally. The end-in-view could be more
sophisticated knowledge and broader collaboration among
multiple constituencies in order to build toward larger aims of
equitable experiences for children in urban settings. In another
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context, the vision might be a focus on serving the needs and
interests of children and adults of color, mobilizing those same
efforts around culturally relevant and sustaining educational
practices.

How Social Is a Social Justice Teaching Ethics?
A second philosophical concern implied in Hytten’s (2015) essay is
how to balance an individual ethics with an institutional ethics and
a larger social ethics. The teaching ethics discourse is largely
individualistic and in that sense conventional in its application of
ethical theory, owing to the traditions that the authors work in.
Hytten has this to say about it: “What is sometimes lacking is
critical reflection on the context in which teachers work, and the
larger mission of schooling” (p. 6). Ethical frames that treat moral
action solely as the province of the individual are of limited use in
the face of structurally based social problems and power relations
that work through actors without them being aware of it.
This individual/social concern comes out in Hytten’s (2015)
engagement with Campbell’s arguments about the dangers associated with teachers’ moral agency that may become political activism.
In her work on teacher professionalism, Campbell (2008, 2013)
protected the role of the teacher as a moral agent and kept it separate
from the political. This type of argument de-emphasizes the power
that the teacher as moral agent may operate in promoting the social
order or the ways in which education policy may change the power
relations operating in schools (Biesta, 2004; Gunzenhauser, 2012). By
separating ethics from politics, Campbell did not anticipate the ways
in which power more generally intersects with ethics. For instance,
the argument does not anticipate that political action may become
necessary in order to defend or conserve the teacher’s place as a
moral agent and moral actor.
Hytten (2015) is not likewise constrained. She works against a
tendency of philosophers to slice ethics away from other philosophical concerns. The social justice classroom Hytten envisions is a site
where deep democracy is enacted, and we get the sense that the
process is a great deal of work. We could devote more discussion
about the collaborative and collective nature of that work, which
would help round out the ethics she imagines. Specifically, we may
help teachers connect their ethical predispositions to sensitivity to
collective action—starting with the individualized ethics and
providing frameworks for educators to develop social ethics and
plans for collective action.
Collective action may be a more reasonable and effective
outcome, compared to the critical perspectives expressed in the
social justice literature. As an empirical counterexample to
Campbell’s concern, Hytten (2015) makes use of the systematic
study by Cochran-Smith and her colleagues (2009) of student
teachers educated in a social justice education program at Boston
College. Rather than developing politically ideological teachers,
the program fostered culturally sensitive and largely ethical
teachers with a clear sense of service to and interest in the students
with which they work. In this program at least, the students
exhibited the kinds of moral positions that Campbell described as
desirable in teachers without the sets of macro political commitments that might be expected. Perhaps the commitment to practice
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is of greater value than the specific macro political commitments,
in addition to providing evidence that indoctrination does not
appear to be the effect.

Enacting a Social Ethics
Hytten (2015) draws from Sockett’s (2009) argument of three
virtues of teacher practice—character, intellect, and care—to name
three accompanying habits that would contribute to a social justice
teaching ethics. These three areas encourage space for dialogue
about ethics in social justice teaching. I summarize these here and
suggest two additional habits to round out Hytten’s ethics for social
justice teaching.
Reflective humility is a habit for social justice educators to
cultivate in themselves and in their students. Reflective humility
builds character, an approach to ethics that Hytten (2015)
embraces tentatively, considering her discomfort with the
conservative nature of the character education discourse. For
Hytten, reflective humility includes dialogue with diverse others.
Social justice educators are encouraged to own their defensiveness and frustration. They should be open to challenges to their
convictions, and they should engage in active listening. Educators
should model convictions expressed with openness to difference
and other beliefs.
Dewey appears in Hytten’s (2015) essay when she addresses the
habit of open-mindedness. While she does not go in this particular
direction, Hytten’s argument calls to mind psychological perspectives on prejudice. We are not as likely to challenge ourselves, she
argues, when we see something new. The social justice classroom that
Hytten imagines is one in which participants learn from each other
and the instructor is learning from the perspectives of students as
well. Further directions that could be explored here include Garrison’s (1996) discussion of listening. We might also explore more
explicitly developmental perspectives that may enable the social
justice instructors to appreciate the psychological experience of their
students, especially undergraduate students.
Hytten (2015) advocates a form of caring ethics reminiscent of
Noddings (1984), played out in culturally responsive form in the
work of Valenzuela (1999), with sympathetic attentiveness, wherein
caring is offered by the one-caring and received and acknowledged
by the cared-for. Sympathetic attentiveness demands the educator
attempt to understand with generosity the views of others, especially
when these views are different from the educator’s own. The instructor as the one-caring is nonjudgmental and nonaccusatory, there is
recognition of human unfinishedness (Freire, 1970/1990), and the
instructor operates under the assumption that others’ moral
judgments are based upon good intentions (Nash, 2002). Sympathetic attentiveness is a richly educational habit and one that could be
developed conceptually in varied ethical frames.
Taken together, these habits go a long way toward ethically
grounding the social justice classroom. Some complementary
practices could be cultivated to address the aspects of collective
action that Hytten (2015) values in her vision of social justice
pedagogy. In the language of virtues and habits, we might refer to
these additional contributors, described here as solidarity and
comfort with discomfort, as communal habits. These habits and
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habits like them inform both teaching ethics and teaching practices
and are largely implied in Hytten’s article.
Moving beyond individualistic ethical frames, a social justice
educator may work to build solidarity among students in the
classroom. If the emphasis in the classroom is largely on the
majority-culture student without much experience of difference,
then attending to social justice can place individual students in
opposition to others. An individual ethics may actually encourage
the opposition. In light of that possibility, some kind of ethics of
solidarity might provide a counteracting force. Solidarity can be
placed in contrast to consensus. Solidarity implies not that everyone is in agreement on an idea or belief but that various people
agree on an action that will be undertaken (and reflected upon)
together (Welch, 2000). For instance, teacher education students in
a field experience course might agree to all work together to learn
from each other’s experiences encountering children of varied
backgrounds in their classrooms. Additionally, to build solidarity
through material interaction, they might agree to work together on
a service-learning project. Solidarity can also emerge more
modestly through the creation of a communal space. Hytten (2015)
characterizes just such a communal space within the values and
vision she names for the classroom.
Hytten (2015) notes that the communal space of the social
justice classroom need not be guaranteed to be “safe” to the extent
that no one is challenged to think differently. Leading students into
discomfort is challenging, and as Hytten notes, some social justice
pedagogues argue that crisis is an essential prerequisite for learning. While the reliance on stage theory and the necessity of
psychological crisis can certainly be overdone and can lead to
unnecessarily standardizing the development trajectories of
students, it is problematic to assume that keeping everyone safe and
comfortable in the classroom will lead to such important educational goals as learning from difference. Clarity on educational
goals certainly helps in this case; for example, in teacher preparation programs, students may express discomfort with participating
in field experiences in areas of their communities in which they
have little experience. That discomfort is not something that the
social justice educator can control, but neither should it be ignored.
It should instead be acknowledged and engaged. Instructors, in
other words, need to cultivate a comfort with discomfort and
develop practices that make discomfort productive.
Hytten’s (2015) essay is provocative and productive of meaningful philosophical conversation about the ethics of social justice
teaching. Arguing from critical and pragmatist sensibilities, she
suggests vital habits to nurture our character, intellect, and caring.
Additional attention to cultivating communal habits, I argue,
would extend her project in meaningful and consistent ways.
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